

Building a Solid Cybersecurity Foundation

NACUSO Las Vegas April 4, 2016

PLATINUM PARTNER



Your **Presenter**Patrick Sickels, CU*Answers


Internal Auditor for 9 years

Financial Compliance for 6 years

Attorney in Michigan

Member of ISACA

Cybersecurity Fundamentals



Old Wine **New Bottles**

Fundamental Position of CU*Answers is that **Cybersecurity** does not fundamentally alter the requirements of protecting member information.



When do you need a **Cybersecurity Program?**

Personally
Identifiable
Financial
Information of
Members

Trade Secrets or other Privileged Information from a Financial Institution

DATA BREACHES

DATA RECORDS LOST OR STOLEN IN 2015

707,509,815

ONLY 4% of breaches were "Secure Breaches" where encryption was used and the stolen data was rendered useless.

1,938,383 records lost or stolen every day



80,766 (24h) records every hour





Credit Unions: Industry Stats

2015 largest credit union breach:

Winston-Salem based Piedmont Advantage CU (\$308M)

Had to notify 46,000 members of a missing laptop that contained PII

2014 Average spend on Cybersecurity: \$136K (source: NAFCU)

2014 Average spend costs associated with merchant data breaches: \$226K (source: NAFCU)

Notification law is based on where the member resides

Source: CU Times/ Safenet

CFPB: UDAAP (Unfair/Deceptive Practice)



2016 first action by CFPB on cybersecurity:

Online payment processor

Accused of lying about PCI Compliance

Accused of lying about their security procedures (encryption)

Released apps without testing security

Fined \$100,000 Cease and Desist Order Fix application release process

FTC claims the same authority (Wyndam Hotels)

Source: CFPB



"Does the board of directors approve of and oversee the development, implementation, and maintenance of the program, including assigning specific responsibility for its implementation and reviewing reports from management?"

On an **annual** basis, make sure the **Board Minutes** reflect that the Information Security (and Cybersecurity Policy) were **approved** by the board. What else?

Governance

Reports of Policy Violations

Reports of Incident Responses

Reports of Internal and External Audit Exceptions



Remember, it is okay to fight (especially when it comes to business)






Comprehensive InfoSec Plan

Cyber Security Policy InfoSec Program

"... a comprehensive written information security program including administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the nature and scope of its activities"

Add the word **Cybersecurity** to your InfoSec Plan or even create a brand new Cybersecurity Policy. Your Cybersecurity Policy can state what your **employees** are responsible for.

Comprehensive InfoSec Plan



"... ensure the security and confidentiality of member information; protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such information; and protect against unauthorized access to or use of such information that could result in **substantial harm or inconvenience to any member**"

Logical (Computer) Security

"... Access controls on member information systems, including controls to authenticate and permit access only to authorized individuals and controls to prevent employees from providing member information to unauthorized individuals who may seek to obtain this information through fraudulent means"

Identify systems with member info

Regularly determine who has access in a timely fashion

Reasonably remove access in a timely fashion

Physical Access Controls




"... Access restrictions at physical locations containing member information, such as buildings, computer facilities, and records storage facilities to permit access only to authorized individuals"

Identify
physical
locations with
member data

Regularly determine who has access Reasonably remove access in a timely fashion

Data **Encryption**Data **Loss Prevention**



"... Encryption of electronic member information, including while in transit or in storage on networks or systems to which unauthorized individuals may have access"



Intrusion **Detection and Prevention**




"... monitoring systems and procedures to detect actual and attempted attacks on or intrusions into member information systems"

Intrusion detection systems work by either looking for signatures of known attacks or deviations of normal activity. These deviations or anomalies are pushed up the stack and examined at the protocol and application layer.

System **Modifications**Change **Controls**




"... Procedures designed to ensure that member information system modifications are consistent with the ... information security program"



Segregation of **Duties**



"... Dual controls procedures, segregation of duties, and employee background checks for employees with responsibilities for or access to member information"



Terry Childs

Network Manager for the City of San Francisco

Designed their FiberWAN and even received a copyright for it

Was the **only** person with passwords, and the only person who could support it (completely protective of his turf)


Network was being audited without his knowledge (he claimed theft and intrusion by the security professional doing the audit)

They demanded the usernames and passwords for the network and **he would not give the passwords to the city**

He was arrested and finally gave the information directly to the Mayor, who visited him in his cell

Sentenced to four years on a felony account of computer tampering, and ordered to pay \$1.5m in fines





Response **Program**



"... Response programs that specify actions to be taken when ... unauthorized individuals have gained access to member information systems, including appropriate reports to regulatory and law enforcement agencies"



Business **Resumption**



"... Measures to protect against destruction, loss, or damage of member information due to potential environmental hazards, such as fire and water damage or technical failures"

Environment
Protection
(fire, moisture, heat)

Backups
(restoration in time and restoration far enough back)

Testing the Plan at least annually

Six Lines of Code

Tim Lloyd was an 11 year network engineer with Omega Engineering

He was angry at a demotion and was eventually fired for insubordination

He wrote six lines of code that deleted all of Omega's software

Omega did not have sufficient backups

Omega stayed in business but laid off 80 employees and lost \$10 million in sales

- 1. 7/30/96
- 2. F:
- 3. F:\LOGIN\LOGIN 12345
- 4. CD \PUBLIC
- 5. FIX.EXE /Y F:*.*
- 6. PURGE F:\ /ALL





Vendor Management



"... Measures to protect against destruction, loss, or damage of member information due to potential environmental hazards, such as fire and water damage or technical failures"



Cyber Liability **Insurance**

Risk Mitigation (Contractual) (Insurance)

We will not give an opinion on the quality of a particular carrier's insurance. Our recommendation is to ensure that your organization has a clear understanding of:

Coverage (example: member notification)

Exclusions (very critical)

Payout triggers

Carrier control

Limitations

Deductibles

Knowledge and **Best Practices**

Cybersecurity Resources





Knowledge and **Best Practices**

Cybersecurity Resources







Knowledge and Best Practices Cybersecurity Resources



CU*Answers Cybersecurity Policy (PDF)

<u>CU*Answers Information Security Policy (PDF)</u>

CU*Answers Acceptable Use Policy (PDF)

Cybersecurity Policy Template for Credit Unions (Word)

Information Security Program for Credit Unions (Word)

Acceptable Use Policy Template for Credit Unions (Word)

Knowledge and **Best Practices**

Cybersecurity Resources



The Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense Version 5.0



https://www.sans.org/media/critical-security-controls/CSC-5.pdf

Knowledge and **Best Practices**

Cybersecurity Resources



Australian Government
Department of Defence
Intelligence and Security

Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions

Originally published 18 February 2010, updated for February 2014

CYBER SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTR

Mitigati Strates Effective Rankir for 201 (and 20	gy ness ng 14	Mitigation Strategy	Overall Security Effectiveness	User Resistance	Equipment,	Maintenance Cost (Mainly Staff)	Helps Detect Intrusions	Helps Prevent Intrusion Stage 1: Code Execution	Helps Contain Intrusion Stage 2: Network Propagation	Helps Contain Intrusion Stage 3: Data Exfiltration
1	(1)	Application whitelisting of permitted/trusted programs, to prevent execution of malicious or unapproved programs including .DLL files, scripts and installers.	Essential	Medium	High	Medium	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	(2)	Patch applications e.g. Java, PDF viewer, Flash, web browsers and Microsoft Office. Patch/mitigate systems with "extreme risk" vulnerabilities within two days. Use the latest version of applications.	Essential	Low	High	High	No	Yes	Possible	No
3	(3)	Patch operating system vulnerabilities. Patch/miligate systems with "extreme risk" vulnerabilities within two days. Use the latest suitable operating system version. Avoid Microsoft Windows XP.	Essential	Low	Medium	Medium	No	Yes	Possible	No
4	(4)	Restrict administrative privileges to operating systems and applications based on user duties. Such users should use a separate unprivileged account for email and web browsing.	Essential	Medium	Medium	Low	No	Possible	Yes	No

http://www.asd.gov.au/publications/Mitigation_Strategies_2014.pdf

Cybersecurity Checklist



Plain-language checklist

Basic controls to protect systems and data Easy to understand

Not an official standard, but one we need to pay attention to

Over 1,000 items

Usccu.us

ORGANIZED BY INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Harder to Penetrate

Identification Badges

- Are all employees required to wear personal photo ID badges, issued by the organization?
- □ Are all visitors or vendors required to wear temporary photo ID badges, issued by the organization?
- ☐ Are the photo ID badges designed to facilitate introductions and communication between personnel, rather than just used for security?
- ☐ If the photo ID badges can be worn on cords, are they printed the same way on

Incident Response: Tactics

Knowledge and Best Practices

Test the plan before a breach

Identify the breach response team

Have a communications plan locked and loaded


Understand regulations and contracts that govern post-breach obligations

Determine what experts you will engage in advance

Respond in an "all out fashion" when breach detected

Preserve evidence Engage insurance carrier Engage regulators and law enforcement early





Source: gemalto



Risk Matrix

INSTRUCTIONS: For each category, enter a score of 1-5 corresponding to the risk level. Once the average is calculated, round to the nearest and enter the average risk level for each category. This will give the organization insight as to how the FFIEC views its inherent cybersecurity risk. Such findings are not necessarily indicitive of the actual risk faced by the organization. For more information, review the
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cybersecurity risk. Such findings are not necessarily indicitive of the
Risk Levels
Moderate (3) Significant (4) Most (5) SCORE
lexity (1- Moderate Complexity Significant Complexity Substantial Complexity
s) (21-100 Connections) (101-200 Connections) (>200 Connections)
of Several instances of Significant instances Substantial instances
unsecured of unsecured of unsecured
1-5) connections (6-10) connections (11-25) connections (>25)
ss Guest and corporate Wireless corporate Wireless corporate
st wireless network network access; network access; all
corporate access are logically significant number of employees have
1-

http://www.cuanswers.com/wp-content/uploads/FFIEC-Cybersecurity-Assessment-Inherent-Risk-Base-Worksheet.xlsx



Maturity Models

Ca	ategory T	Data Point	₩	Rating	₩	Narrative	₩	Least	w	Minimal	₩
		Total number of Internet									
		service provider (ISP)									
Te	echnologies and Connection	connections (including				<u> </u>				Minimal Complexity (1-20	
Ту	/pes	branch connections)				▼		No connections		Connections)	
		Unsecured external									
		connections, number of									
		connections not users (e.g.,	,								
Te	echnologies and Connection	file transfer protocol (FTP),								Few instances of unsecured	l l
Ту	/pes	Telnet, rlogin)						None		connections (1–5)	

http://www.cuanswers.com/wp-content/uploads/FFIEC-Cybersecurity-Assessment-Tool-2.xlsx



Maturity Models

First of all, the Maturity Model statements are not well correlated to the risks identified in the FFIEC Inherent Risk Tool.

Second, there is a significant amount of arbitrariness in the ranking of the various Maturity levels. (The FFIEC requires that a financial institution meet all of the categories of one Maturity before moving on to the next level). For example, to get to the "Advanced" Maturity of Oversight, an institution must be able to answer affirmatively that "The budget process for requesting additional cybersecurity staff and tools maps current resources and tools to the cybersecurity strategy." This requirement is not well thought out and does not seem to have a clear relationship to cybersecurity. Clarity of expected output is missing in many of the Maturity Tool statements.

In addition, there are certain categories that do not appear at all to be relevant in the credit union space. Very few credit unions will be able to answer that "Supply chain risk is reviewed before the acquisition of mission-critical information systems including system components."



Maturity Models



October 8, 2015

The Case for Voluntary Use of the FFIEC Cybersecurity Tool

Patrick Sickels, Internal Auditor

http://www.cuanswers.com/wp-content/uploads/The-Case-for-Voluntary-Use-of-the-FFIEC-Cybersecurity-Tool-v2.pdf

Breach Prevention or **Breach Management?**

The evidence shows breaches cannot be stopped

Prevention strategies are still important but in 2016 the focus and priorities will shift to breach acceptance strategies

Breach Acceptance Tactics/Perspective:

- Incident Response Plan Priority
- 2. Data security centric
- 3. Sliding scale authentication strategies
- 4. Refocus on the endpoint

Incident Response: Data Security Centric Tactics

- Data will be moved across systems
 - Containing data reduces value to end users
 - Think "Big Data" / "Data Warehouses" / Cloud computing

Encryption of PII data

- PII data that has been encrypted is less valuable to attackers
- Increasing the cost of attacking your organization will significantly
- reduce the threat of a breach (attackers have costs, too).
- Encrypt PII data everywhere it is at rest (i.e. stored), regardless of system
- Encrypt PII data motion on the network

Encryption: "Gotchas"

Encryption increases the cost of an attack – that's good

Encryption increases costs to the organization – that's reality Key management – protecting the material that encrypts the data Do you have a key management policy? How do you keep key material secure / private? Encryption is under attack SSLv2; SSLv3, TLS, SSH, etc. Successfully attacking even weak encryption is still hard Encryption requires maintenance Patching / Compatibility issues Moving to new forms is expensive and requires coordination with members/partners

Network security devices (firewalls/IDS/IPS) can't inspect encrypted traffic for threats

Data Breach Management:

User Authentication/Access Tactics

More authentication types than we can shake a stick at (passwords, biometrics, one-time passwords, cell phones, USB sticks, etc.)

A data-centric perspective on security:

- Authentication barriers based on the context of the user action
- Layers of authentication based on the risk
- Sliding scale of authentication barriers based on the risk of the request/transaction

Outsourcing authentication

- Can outside experts make authentication decisions more accurately than we can?
- Will members demand external authentication (cell phones, google authenticator, etc.?)
- How will internal/external authentication processes be layered/implemented?

User Authentication Tactics: Your Network

When will we shift to sliding-scale risk based authentication for internal/network users?

When will passwords be relegated to low-risk activities only?

Readily available systems can compromise 19 character passwords in less than 3 weeks (low cost to attacker)

27% of US employees would sell their passwords for \$1,000 or less (source: Sailpoint.com survey)

Password strength is NOT improving (#1 password is still 123456 and #2 is password)

What you will budget over the next 3 years to implement a tactic to address this concern

Breach Management: Refocus on the Endpoint

Users interact with PII at the workstation/PC/laptop (endpoint)

Bad actors are targeting the workstation to exfiltrate PII

They will also target mobile devices in hopes they'll find your PII there

They are overwhelming traditional AV solutions with sheer volumes of malware

You need a plan for assessing workstation security and addressing weaknesses in 2016

Breach management: Mobile Strategies

Have a policy that governs use of mobile devices and PII

Implement technical controls that can wipe mobile devices


Audit mobile devices against the policy and software updates

Educate users on security best practices

Pros and Cons of Cloud Computing

Pros Low start up costs Automatic software upgrades Ease of use Ease of access – internet connection Scalability – provided by cloud provider Security – cloud providers like Microsoft take it seriously

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Subscription based pricing means you're never done paying
Less flexibility
Security – lack of visibility into what's happening under the covers
On site technology not eliminated – still require some infrastructure
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Questions?